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“Something has Gone Wrong”: The JFS Case
and Defining Jewish Identity in the
Courtroom
HEATHER MILLER RUBENS

†

INTRODUCTION
On October 1, 2009, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom
heard its first case as the newly configured highest judicial authority
in Great Britain, R(E) v. The Governing Body of JFS1 (hereafter the
JFS case). In what seems like an odd choice for the debut of this
judicial body, the Court took up a particularly contentious case
involving a dispute over the preferential admissions process at a
popular Jewish school in London. On the most basic level the judges
attempted to resolve a dispute involving three particularly difficult
interrelated questions: (1) who is a Jew; (2) who gets to decide; and
(3) does the orthodox Jewish practice of determining Jewish status by
matrilineal descent violate the Race Relations Act of 1976?2
As will be discussed in this case study, twelve-year-old “M”
applied for admission to the Jews’ Free School (JFS) in London. The
well-regarded Orthodox Jewish school had more applicants than
seats, and thus JFS employed a policy of giving preference to those

† I wish to thank Peter Danchin, Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, Saba Mahmood,
and Winnifred Fallers Sullivan for inviting me to prepare this case study as part of
the Politics of Religious Freedom Project hosted by the University of California,
Berkeley. I had the privilege of sharing drafts of this case study with several
individuals, each of whom offered valuable insights to improve the end result; of
course all errors are my own. In particular I would like to thank Peter Danchin and
Winnifred Fallers Sullivan as well as my colleagues at the Institute for Christian &
Jewish Studies (Baltimore, MD): Rosann Catalano, Ilyse Kramer and Christopher
Leighton. Additionally, I had the pleasure of teaching this case study with the
Honorable Judge Ellen M. Heller whose commitment to careful legal reasoning,
and to issues affecting the Jewish community, enriched my revisions of this article.
1. [2009] UKSC 15, [2010] 2 A.C. 728 (S.C.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
2. Race Relations Act, 1976, c. 74 (U.K.), amended by Race Relations Act,
2000, c. 34 (U.K), repealed by Equality Act, 2010, c. 15 (U.K.).
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applicants who were “recognised as being Jewish by the Office of the
Chief Rabbi (OCR).”3 M was denied entry to JFS because he was not
recognized as Jewish according to Orthodox Jewish standards as
determined by an Orthodox interpretation of the halacha (Jewish
law): M would be considered Jewish if his mother was Jewish or if M
wished to undergo a conversion.4 M did not satisfy the OCR’s
matrilineal test, and M himself did not wish to undergo an Orthodox
conversion.5 While M’s father was Jewish by birth, M’s mother had
converted to Judaism under the supervision of the Masorti Jewish
rabbinate.6 England’s OCR does not recognize the validity of
Masorti conversions.7 Thus, according to the OCR, M was not
Jewish because his mother was not Jewish by OCR standards when
she gave birth to M.
M’s father sued JFS, arguing that in utilizing the matrilineal test
JFS’s admissions policy violated the United Kingdom’s Race
Relations Act of 1976.8 The British Supreme Court explained that
while religious discrimination is permissible under British law for
religious schools, racial discrimination is not under the Race
Relations Act. The Court ruled that when JFS utilized the matrilineal
test the school was engaged in ethnic discrimination, rather than
religious discrimination.9 As Lady Hale said in the majority
opinion: “M was rejected, not because of who he is, but because of
who his mother is.”10 The Court instructed JFS to establish a new
test that did not make determinations of Jewish identity based on
ethnicity, but rather based on practice and belief.
In England, religious schools are permitted to give admissions
preference to applicants who share the school’s religious
affiliation. Usually this preference is a matter of mutual agreement
between the students and the schools. Yet as this case demonstrates,
religious communities sometimes disagree about matters of
communal membership, practice, and observance. The Orthodox
Jewish community does not agree with Masorti Jewish interpretations

3. JFS, 15 UKSC at ¶ 24 (Lord Phillips).
4. See id. at ¶ 2 (explaining the “matrilineal test”).
5. Id. at ¶ 6.
6. Id. at ¶¶ 6–7.
7. Id. at ¶ 166 (Lord Hope, concurring).
8. Id. at ¶ 5 (Lord Phillips).
9. Id. at ¶ 41, 45, 50, 51 (Lord Philips); id. at ¶ 66 (Lady Hale); id. at ¶ 103
(Lord Mance); id. at ¶ 124 (Lord Kerr); id. at ¶ 148 (Lord Clarke).
10. Id. at ¶ 66 (Lady Hale).
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of the halacha, and does not recognize the authority of Masorti
Jewish rabbis to perform conversions.11 Until this court decision, the
OCR, the designated authority over Orthodox Judaism in England,
instructed Orthodox Jewish schools that a child was considered
Jewish if he or she was born to a Jewish mother, regardless of his or
her level of religious observance. Failing this, a child could also
apply to undergo a conversion that would be recognized by the
OCR. However, in December 2009, the OCR’s matrilineal test was
declared illegal in JFS. In the aftermath of this decision, England’s
Orthodox Jewish schools have had to develop different means of
determining Jewishness for the admissions process that are no longer
grounded in their interpretation of the halacha, but rather are
grounded in an arguably Protestant Christian framework that
determines religious identity in terms of belief and practice.
Additionally, this case appears to resolve denominational differences
on determining Jewish status internal to England’s Jewish
community, making this apparently secular court the arbiter of a
religious dispute. In the wake of the JFS decision, we are left to
wonder if religious freedom can exist beyond the borders of
Protestant Christian terms and concepts.
I. CONTEXTS
Is Judaism a religion? Are Jews a distinct race or ethnicity? Do
Jews constitute a people or nation? Is Jewishness a cultural reality?
As many notable Jewish Studies and Religious Studies scholars have
shown,12 these questions regarding the status of Judaism and
Jewishness are historically modern ones. Before the development of
the nation-state, determining Jewish identity was a relatively
unambiguous yes/no proposition. For Jews living in the medieval and
early modern historical periods, these questions simply did not exist
in distinct spheres – you either were a Jew or you were not a Jew. So

11. See id. at ¶ 181 (Lord Hope, concurring) (“The OCR does not recognize
the validity of conversions carried out by non-Orthodox authorities, as they do not
require converts to subscribe fully to the tenets of Orthodox Judaism.”).
12. See, e.g., LEORA BATNITZKY, HOW JUDAISM BECAME A RELIGION: AN
INTRODUCTION TO MODERN JEWISH THOUGHT 1 (2011); JACOB KATZ, TRADITION
AND CRISIS: JEWISH SOCIETY AT THE END OF THE MIDDLE AGES 52−62 (Bernard
Dov Cooperman trans., Syracuse Univ. Press, 2000); DAVID RUDERMAN, EARLY
MODERN JEWRY: A NEW CULTURAL HISTORY (2010).
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what changed all of this? The development of individual citizenship
and the modern nation state, which involved the reimagining of the
role of religion and religious laws in political and public life, and the
status of a person vis-à-vis her community.
Prior to the eighteenth-century, Jews lived in self-governing,
politically autonomous Jewish communities under the protection of
nobilities that permitted their existence. In the medieval and early
modern period, a Jew would have been born into her Jewish
community, and her entire life—political, social, religious, cultural—
was lived within that Jewish community. Matters of ritual
observance, as well as day-to-day social and political concerns, were
adjudicated by the Jewish community according to Jewish law. Each
community had its own legal, educational and health systems in place
to take care of the members of that particular Jewish
community. Understanding this fully integrated pre-modern Jewish
community, and its very sparse interaction with other similarly
situated Christian neighboring communities, helps us better
comprehend the so-called “Jewish Question” of the modern period.
With the development of centralized nation states, and the
dissolution of localized, feudal governance, parsing the status of the
Jewish community, and the Jewish person, was critical to the selffashioning of these new governments. “The Jew” was understood to
be paradigmatic to the Enlightenment era discussions regarding the
relationship between the theological and the political. At the heart of
the debate stood the so-called “Jewish Question”: could a Jew be a
citizen of the state?
Some argued no: Jews could not become full participant citizens
in the emerging European “states” because the Jewish people
constituted a “state within a state;”13 Jewish communities were
separate communal entities and Jews would prioritize their allegiance
to the Jewish community and Jewish law above and against their
fellow citizens and the laws of the state. Others argued yes: Jews
could be full citizens of the states where they lived because Judaism
was principally a religion, and Jewish identity was not communal, but
rather a matter of individual private praxis that involved personal

13. See Johann Gottlieb Fichte, A State Within a State (1793), in THE JEW IN
MODERN WORLD: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 309−10 (Paul Mendes-Flohr &
Jehuda Reinharz eds., 1995).
THE
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observance of the halacha—that is keeping Jewish law.14 The
halacha was not to be understood as a competing political or legal
structure to the State, but rather was apolitical—it simply related to
regulating religious praxis.15 This position was first argued by Moses
Mendelsshon in Jerusalem: Or on Religious Power and
Judaism.16 While certainly not all Jews agreed with Mendelssohn’s
characterization of Judaism and Jewish law, from this point forward,
the conversation about Jewishness, and Jewish identity, had
significantly changed. While in the pre-modern period Jews were a
people, a culture, and a religious community all-in-one, it was now
possible to articulate a Jewish identity in discrete terms. Jewishness
could be understood as a religious identity apart from a political
identity. Jewishness could also be understood as a cultural heritage,
devoid of religious content. Jews could be Jewish, but not keep
Jewish law or follow any ritual observance. In large measure, the
possibilities of understanding Jewish identity in all of these forms
(and of course, many other derivations) created the environment of
the JFS case.
A. What is religion?
When one asks the question, “Is Judaism a religion?” there is a
presumption that “religion” is an identifiable, neutral quantity. Yet as
Jonathan Z. Smith, Talal Asad, and others have shown, this is not the
case.17 Tracing the etymology of the term “religion” from its Latin

14. The experience of the Jewish communities of Western Europe differed
from the experience of Jews living in Eastern Europe in large part because of the
differing political structures. The Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires were
formed by a variety of peoples rather than individuals, thus the Jewish community
remained a corporate unit in Eastern Europe. As the JFS case occurred in England,
we have focused attention the changing political and cultural landscape of Western
Europe, and how that affected Western European Jews.
15. MOSES MENDELSSOHN, JERUSALEM: OR ON RELIGIOUS POWER AND
JUDAISM 130 (Allan Arkush trans., 1983).
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., Jonathan Z. Smith, A Matter of Class: Taxonomies of Religion,
89 HARV. THEOLOGICAL R. 387, 393, 397 (1996) (arguing that while the
classification of religion can be an important scholarly tool, it is often a flawed
process, not fully encompassing the complexity of religion as a varying concept
among the world’s people); Talal Asad, Anthropological Conceptions of Religion:
Reflections on Geertz, 18 MAN 237, 252 (1983) (exploring Clifford Geertz’s essay,
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origins to its contemporary usage, one quickly learns that the
meaning of “religion” has evolved over time and that the current
usage of “religion” is popularly defined in a Protestant Christian
mode. Religion is seen as the (1) voluntary (2) faith and/or belief of
(3) an autonomous individual. Religion is a matter of personal choice
and requires affirmative assent in the form of belief. This faith is
manifested in practice and actions. It is my contention that this
Protestant Christian definition of “religion” is what animates the
decision of the Majority in the JFS case. This raises the very real
question of whether one can fault a non-Christian religion for not
fitting neatly into Christian categories. Indeed, this struggle is not a
new one, but is also part of the history of the “Jewish Question” in
the modern period.
Even while Moses Mendelssohn argued in Jerusalem: Or on
Religious Power and Judaism that Judaism was a religion,
Mendelssohn did not hold that religion should be equated with
voluntary individual belief.18 He writes that “Judaism knows of no
revealed religion in the sense in which Christians understand this
term,” and “Judaism boasts no exclusive revelation of eternal truths”
to which a Jew is required to assent.19 In making these claims
Mendelssohn aims to demonstrate that Judaism, by requiring no
belief in dogma, is more compatible with Enlightenment notions of
reason. But more importantly for our purposes, Mendelssohn is
presenting a competing definition of “religion” as a result of this
move. Religion, in his Jewish terms, need not have anything to do
with belief or personal assent. Rather the Jewish religion involved
being a member of the Jewish people, upon whom it was incumbent
to keep the halacha and engage in Jewish practices.
Since religious schools are allowed to engage in “religious
discrimination” in their admissions process, defining religion is
central to understanding the JFS decision. One of the arguments
made by Didi Herman in her valuable book An Unfortunate
Coincidence: Jews, Jewishness and English Law is that English
judicial discourse in the last century have frequently understood Jews

“Religion as a Cultural System,” and finding that the concept of religion as a
universal, cultural phenomenon hinders the understanding of religion by divorcing
it from the various cultures and social settings from which it emerged and from our
own personal knowledge and responses).
18. See MENDELSSOHN, supra note 15, at 89−90, 97.
19. Id.
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and Jewishness through a Protestant Christian lens, which has
resulted in some fundamental misapprehensions about Jews and
Judaism.20 In her concluding chapters, Herman demonstrates that the
judgments in the JFS case further demonstrates a Christian bias in
defining religion.21 In the aftermath of this case, England’s Jewish
schools have had to create Jewish belief and practice tests to
determine the Jewish status of the applicant.22 Religious identity is
defined by voluntary, individual belief. According to the court,
religion is not, and cannot be, based on collective peoplehood or a
sense of communal belonging that was not rooted in belief and was
not the result of one’s own free choice.23 That notion of Jewish
identity, the court found, was not religion.24 One wonders then if
there is any true religious freedom that goes beyond the borders of
Protestant Christian terms.

20. See Didi Herman, ‘An Unfortunate Coincidence’: Jews and Jewishness in
Twentieth-Century English Discourse, 33 J.L & SOC’Y. 277, 300 (2006) (suggesting
that while other minorities could make the same claim, “the nearly 2000-year
history of Jewish peoples in England, combined with the role Jews, the ‘Old
Testament’, and a ‘Jewish State’ play in Christian theology, have produced a very
particular trajectory of ‘race’ in England,” leaving the area of race studies in the
English legal system bereft of a well-rounded exploration).
21. DIDI HERMAN, AN UNFORTUNATE COINCIDENCE: JEWS, JEWISHNESS, AND
ENGLISH LAW (2011).
22. See infra notes 85−92 and accompanying text; see also R(E) v. Governing
Body of JFS, [2009] UKSC 15, [2010] 2 A.C. 728 (S.C.) ¶ 50 (appeal taken from
Eng.) (Lord Phillips) (noting that after the Court of Appeals decision, JFS changed
its admission policy for September 2010 admissions to examine applicants’ level of
faith practice through a points system, including such factors as synagogue
attendance).
23. JFS, 15 UKSC at ¶¶ 69−70 (Lady Hale) (interpreting the Equality Bill and
U.K. anti-discrimination legislation to preclude a conflation of ethnicity with
religious practice; noting that while the Jewish law governing ethnicity and people
has helped its people survive discrimination and persecution for centuries, “no
other faith schools in [the United Kingdom] adopt descent-based criteria for
admission” and any allowances for exception “should be made by Parliament”).
24. See id. at ¶ 45 (Lord Phillips) (“But one thing is clear about the matrilineal
test; it is a test of ethnic origin. By definition, discrimination that is based upon that
test is discrimination on racial grounds under the Act.”).
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B. Judaism(s) in the Modern Period
Jewish denominationalism as it exists today was also a
development of the modern period, and tracing its nineteenth century
development helps illuminate the intra-Jewish conversation central to
the JFS case. I discuss Reform Judaism, Orthodox Judaism, and
Conservative (Masorti)25 Judaism in chronological order.26
1. Reform Judaism
Reform Judaism is the first of the Jewish responses to the
changing cultural and political landscape of the modern
period. Reform Judaism began in Germany in the nineteenth century
when a few Jewish rabbi-scholars began to modify Jewish ritual and
observance. These modifications were based upon the belief that
while core teachings were revealed by God to Moses at Mt. Sinai,
Judaism had been (and continued to be) an evolving religious
tradition. In brief, Judaism was subject to historical change and thus
Judaism could be modified to respond to the current historical
moment. The ability to reinterpret halacha and modify observance
further allowed the Jewish communities of western Europe to
“confine” their Jewishness to a religious sphere as they began to
embrace their emerging rights as citizens in the newly forming nation
states.
2.

Orthodox Judaism

In opposition to the emergence of Reform Judaism, several
Jewish rabbis rejected the notion that Judaism was subject to
historical change and that observance of the halacha could be
reinterpreted or modified. These Jews did not wish to see Judaism
diminished to the status of religion and confined to spending Sabbath
at the synagogue. Rather they understood Jewish identity and Jewish
observance of the halacha to fully encompass the life of the
individual. Yet even while holding that the halacha could not be
modified, these newly identified Orthodox Jews understood
themselves to also be fully compatible with the emerging political
and cultural changes occurring in Europe—they did not believe that
25. In the United States and Canada, this movement is known as Conservative
Judaism. In Israel, England, and elsewhere in the world, it is known as Masorti
Judaism.
26. This is not an exhaustive list of the various expressions of Judaism
available (e.g. Reconstructionist) but rather aims to highlight the three numerically
largest segments of the Jewish population.
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their observance of the halacha would be in conflict with political
and cultural developments.
3.

Conservative (Masorti) Judaism

Chronologically, Conservative (Masorti) Judaism was the third
Jewish response to modernity, and these rabbis and Jewish leaders
sought middle ground between Reform and Orthodox iterations of
Judaism. Originally known as “Positive-Historical Judaism,” this
strand of Jewish belief and observance did not embrace the full extent
of the changes posed by some Reform Jewish leaders (for example,
many wanted to keep Hebrew language central, as well as observe a
kosher diet), yet at the same time they did not reject the historicalcritical approach to Jewish history and what adopting those told
meant for understanding the halacha (e.g. they were open to the
possibility of changes to ritual observance).
4. Denominationalism and the JFS Case
The rise of Jewish denominationalism and the possibility of
choosing whether to be Jewish is a modern phenomenon. Each of the
Jewish communities (as well as other iterations of Jewish identity not
explored here) has a different method for determining Jewish status
and Jewish membership, and the communities do not agree about
those parameters. The two central questions to this case are: (1) who
should set the parameters for Jewish status; and (2) how should those
membership guidelines be established?
C. The Education System in England
Prior to 1870, schooling in England was done on an ad hoc basis
exclusively by religious communities. Principally, schools were built
and run by the Church of England, although other religious groups,
such as Jews and Roman Catholics, also built their own schools. By
1870, the religious communities had not been able to open a
sufficient number of schools to meet the education needs of all of
England’s children. Hence the Elementary Education Act of 1870
was passed to allow government to build and run elementary schools
where such schools were needed.27 The existing religious schools
continued to operate as before. Government’s first foray into building
27. Elementary Education Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., c. 75 (Eng.).
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a school system was to “fill-in-the-gaps”—to have the government
provide schools in regions inadequately served by religious
schools. These new government built-and-run schools became
popularly known as “provided schools” or “board schools,” as they
were provided and operated by school boards. From this point
forward, a dual system of religious and government schools in
England formally came into being. All subsequent discussions of
elementary education reform in Great Britain deal with this dual
system of religious and government schools. Since the 1950s, both
religious and government schools receive government funds, and
most contemporary discussions of education reform continue to
debate the role of government funding and oversight for religious
schools.
II. JUDGMENTS (EDITED AND ANNOTATED)
All nine judges wrote separate judgments for this case,
demonstrating the complexity of the issues under consideration, as
well as the nuanced differences in judicial reasoning utilized by the
judges in crafting their judgments. With such a large number of legal
voices, it is unsurprising that certain judges explicated various
sections of this case more comprehensively, and with more clarity,
than others. As a result, I have chosen to not use just one judgment in
this case study, but have drawn from several judgments in order to
make the JFS case, and the legal and religious questions it raises,
accessible to a wide readership. After each extended excerpt I note
the quoted judge.
A. Factual Background
1.

JFS—A Brief History of the School & the School’s Mission

While almost all the judges restated the facts of this case, Lord
Hope’s exposition is comprehensive of the major issues. The
following are excerpts from Lord Hope’s opinion:
JFS, formerly the Jewish Free School, is a voluntary
aided comprehensive secondary school which is
maintained by the local authority, the London
Borough of Brent. It has a long and distinguished
history which can be traced back to 1732. It has over
2000 pupils, and for more than the past 10 years it has
been over-subscribed. It regularly has twice the
number of applicants for the places that are available.
Clause 8 of its Instrument of Government dated 18
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October 2005 provides:
“Statement of School Ethos
Recognising its historic foundation, JFS will preserve
and develop its religious character in accordance with
the principles of orthodox Judaism, under the guidance
of the Chief Rabbi of the United Hebrew
Congregations of the Commonwealth. The School
aims to serve its community by providing education of
the highest quality within the context of Jewish belief
and practice. It encourages the understanding of the
meaning of the significance of faith and promotes
Jewish values for the experience of all its pupils.”
Further information is given by the school on its
website, which states:
“The outlook and practice of the School is Orthodox.
One of our aims is to ensure that Jewish values
permeate the School. Our students reflect the very
wide range of the religious spectrum of British Jewry.
Whilst two thirds or more of our students have
attended Jewish primary schools, a significant number
of our Year 7 intake has not attended Jewish schools
and some enter the School with little or no Jewish
education. Many come from families who are totally
committed to Judaism and Israel; others are unaware
of Jewish belief and practice. We welcome this
diversity and embrace the opportunity to have such a
broad range of young people developing Jewish values
together.”
The culture and ethos of the school is Orthodox
Judaism. But there are many children at JFS whose
families have no Jewish faith or practice at all.28
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS: Lord Hope’s final comment here
illuminates an underlying conceptual challenge for the judges

28. R(E) v. Governing Board of JFS, [2009] UKSC 15, [2010] 2 A.C. 728
(S.C.) ¶ 164 (appeal taken from Eng.) (Lord Hope, concurring).
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throughout the case. While there are many children at JFS whose
families have no “faith” or “practice” in the opinion of the court, they
are still considered to be Jewish by the Orthodox Chief Rabbi and the
Orthodox Jewish community. Can there be an Orthodox Jewish
atheist? Why would JFS, and the Orthodox Jewish community, have
an interest in educating such a child? Why is this concept difficult for
the Court to address? Could this difficulty arise because such a
category does not map easily onto Christian norms? Who defines
what “religion” is?
There are a variety of Judaisms practiced today all over the
world (Reconstructionst, Reform, Conservative, Masorti, Orthodox,
etc.). Should legal courts recognize the very real differences between
these communities in understanding Jewish identity? Would you
expect the court to recognize the real differences between various
Christians (Presbyterian, Methodist, Roman Catholic, Anglican,
Evangelical, Mormon, etc.) and their various interpretations of
Christian identity? Should matters of community membership be
determined by “secular” courts or by the communities themselves?
2. JFS Admissions Policy & Criteria for Determining Jewish
Status
As mentioned in the introduction, religious schools are permitted
to give admissions preference to applicants who share the school’s
religious affiliation. Within the Jewish community, conversion and
matrilineal descent have been two main ways of determining Jewish
status for centuries.29 This case deals with both aspects: the mother’s
Masorti (and not Orthodox) conversion is part of the dispute, as well
as the question of whether one should consider maternal status at all
when determining the Jewish identity of a child. It is important to
note that while some Reform Jewish communities have interpreted
halacha to include patrilineal descent as well matrilineal descent in
determining Jewish status in the modern period, no Jewish
community has ever entirely rejected parental descent as a marker for
Jewish identity. The identity of the parents continues to be essential
in discussion of the identity of the child in all Jewish communities.
Patrilineal/matrilineal descent as a marker for Jewishness has no real
analogue to other religious frameworks, making it challenging for the
judges to comprehend. Below is Lord Hope’s engagement with the

29. Id. at ¶ 182 (Lord Hope, concurring); id. at ¶ 248 (Lord Brown, dissenting).
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issue of determining Jewish identity according to Orthodox Jewish
standards:
Prior to the decision of the Court of Appeal in this
case the principal admissions criterion of JFS was that,
unless undersubscribed, it would admit only children
who were recognised as being Jewish by the OCR. Its
policy for the year 2008/09, which can be taken to be
the same as that for the year in question in this case,
was as follows:
“It is JFS (“the School”) policy to admit up to the
standard admissions number children who are
recognised as being Jewish by the Office of the Chief
Rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregation of the
Commonwealth (OCR) or who have already enrolled
upon or who have undertaken, with the consent of
their parents, to follow any course of conversion to
Judaism under the approval of the OCR.”
The Chief Rabbi is the head of the largest groups of
Orthodox synagogues in the United Kingdom. But he
does not represent all Orthodox communities, nor does
he represent the Masorti, Reform and Progressive
Jewish communities. In accordance with Jewish law,
the OCR recognises as Jewish any child who is
descended from a Jewish mother. The mother herself
must be descended from a Jewish mother or must have
been converted to Judaism before the birth of the child
in a manner recognised as valid by the OCR. Such a
child is recognised by the OCR as Jewish regardless of
the form of Judaism practised by the family
(Orthodox, Masorti, Reform or Progressive). He is so
recognised even if the entire family has no Jewish
faith or observance at all. A family may be entirely
secular in its life and outlook. Its members may be
atheists or even be practising Christians or practising
Muslims. Yet, if the child was himself born of a
Jewish mother, he will be recognised as Jewish by the
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OCR and eligible for a place at JFS.30
3. M’s Jewish Status—According to the OCR & SelfIdentification
These proceedings have been brought in relation to a
child, M on the application of his father, E. M’s father
is of Jewish ethnic origin. M’s mother is Italian by
birth and ethnic origin. Before she married E she
converted to Judaism under the auspices of a nonOrthodox synagogue. Her conversion is recognised as
valid by the Masorti, Reform and Progressive
Synagogues. But it was undertaken in a manner that is
not recognised by the OCR. She and E are now
divorced and M lives mainly with his father. He and
his father practise Judaism, and they are both members
of the Masorti New London Synagogue. M practices
his own Jewish faith, prays in Hebrew, attends
synagogue and is a member of a Jewish Youth Group.
But the OCR does not recognise him as of Jewish
descent in the maternal line. His mother is not
recognised as Jewish by the OCR and he has not
undergone, or undertaken to follow, a course of
approved Orthodox conversion.
Consequently he was unable to meet the school’s
criterion for admission. In April 2007 he was refused a
place at JFS for year 7 in the academic year 20072008.31
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS: Since JFS is an Orthodox Jewish
school that recognizes the authority of the OCR in Jewish matters,
should the school be forced to recognize other Jewish authorities?
Would you apply the same criterion to Christian schools—should a
Roman Catholic school be forced to accept a Presbyterian or a LatterDay-Saints student applicant as part of its preferential pool because
all parties are arguably Christian? Who should make this
determination?

30. Id. at ¶ 165 (Lord Hope, concurring).
31. Id. at ¶ 166.
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B. Procedural Background
E, on behalf of M, sought to appeal the admissions decision,
utilizing first the internal appeals process available to him at the
school.32 When that process failed, and M was still denied
preferential admissions, E next appealed to the civil courts arguing
that in utilizing the test of matrilineal descent to deny E Jewish status,
JFS was in violation of the Race Relations Act of 1976.33 Lord
Phillips described the posture of the case when it arrived in the
Supreme Court:
E failed in these judicial review proceedings in which
he challenged the admissions policy of JFS before
Munby J, but succeeded on an appeal to the Court of
Appeal. The question of M’s admission has already
been resolved between the parties, but the Governing
Body of JFS is concerned at the finding of the Court
of Appeal that the school’s admissions policy
infringes the 1976 Act, as are the United Synagogue
and the Secretary of State for Children, Schools and
Families. Indeed this case must be of concern to all
Jewish faith schools which have admissions policies
that give preference to Jews.34
It is important to note that E & M are not disputing the right of
the Jewish school to give preferential admissions treatment to
Jews. Rather they are disputing the School’s use of Orthodox Jewish
standards, in accordance with the Office of the Chief Rabbi, to
determine Jewish status, which determines eligibility for the
admissions preference.35 E & M are making the claim that in
conferring Jewish status according to Orthodox standards that utilize
matrilineal descent the school is in violation of the Race Relations
Act and that the school must find another method of determining
Jewish status.36

32. Id. at ¶ 167.
33. Id. at ¶¶ 167−68.
34. Id. at ¶ 7 (Lord Phillips).
35. Id. at ¶ 6.
36. Id. at ¶ 7.
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DISCUSSION QUESTIONS: If JFS had utilized a different
criterion to distinguish between the Orthodox and Masorti Jewish
communities, and in effect excluded M from the school, by saying
that M did not qualify for a place because he was a practicing Masorti
Jew, and not an Orthodox Jew, would that have changed the Court’s
ruling? Would that have changed the Court’s willingness to even take
up the case? What would have happened to the school’s stated
interest in educating secular and atheist Jewish children whose
families have no affiliation with synagogues?
C. The Race Relations Act of 1976
The following are excerpts from the relevant laws under
consideration for these judgments. First is the relevant portion of the
Race Relations Act of 1976. It is important to note that the judges
understood the test of Jewish matrilineal descent to be a test
concerning “ethnic origins” as defined by Section 3 of this Act.37
Section 1 of the Race Relations Act 1976 defines race
discrimination. It was amended by the Race Relations
Act 1976 (Amendment) Regulations 2003 (SI
2003/1626) which, implementing Council Directive
2000/43 EC of 29 June 2000, rewrote in European
terms the concept of indirect discrimination. So far as
material it provides as follows:
“(1) A person discriminates against another in any
circumstances relevant for the purposes of any
provision of this Act if –
(a) on racial grounds he treats that other less
favourably than he treats or would treat other
persons …
(1A) A person also discriminates against another if, in
any circumstances relevant for the purposes of any
provision referred to in subsection (1B), he applies to
that other a provision, criterion or practice which he
applies or would apply equally to persons not of the
same race or ethnic or national origins as that other,
but –

37. Race Relations Act, 1976, c. 74, § 3 (U.K.); id. at ¶ 190 (Lord Hope,
concurring).
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(a) which puts or would put persons of the same
race or ethnic or national origins as that other at a
particular disadvantage when compared with
other persons,
(b) which puts or would put that other at that
disadvantage, and
(c) which he cannot show to be a proportionate
means of achieving a legitimate aim.”
…
Section 3 of the 1976 Act provides:
“(1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires
–
‘racial grounds’ means any of the following grounds,
namely colour, race, nationality or ethnic or national
origins;
‘racial group’ means a group of persons defined by
reference to colour, race, nationality or ethnic or
national origins, and references to a person’s racial
group refer to any racial group into which he falls.
(2) The fact that a racial group comprises two or more
distinct racial groups does not prevent it from
constituting a particular racial group for the purposes
of this Act.
…
(4) A comparison of the case of a person of a
particular racial group with that of a person not of that
group under section 1(1) or (1A) must be such that the
relevant circumstances in the one case are the same, or
not materially different, in the other.”38

38. JFS, 15 UKSC at ¶¶ 170−71.

2014]

THE JFS CASE AND DEFINING JEWISH IDENTITY

385

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS: What would you surmise is the
purpose of this 1976 Act: to combat racism and other acts of
discrimination grounded on racial, ethnic, religious or national
stereotypes, or to categorize certain persons in the UK by racial,
ethnic, religious, or national groups? Let’s say a group of young men
assaulted another man because they believed him to be Muslim. The
victim of the assault was not in fact Muslim, but Sikh. Does the
actual identity of the victim matter or rather does the intention of the
group of young men (racial animus) matter? How would this analogy
apply to the JFS case?
D. The Religious Charter of Schools Regulations
Next, the Court recognized the ability of religious schools to
give admissions preference to those applicants who are identified as
being members of that religion. However, the Court noted that the
faith-based criteria applied to the applicants must not be in violation
of any other discriminatory legislation.
Paragraphs 2.41-2.43 of the School Admissions Code
for 2007 deals with faith-based oversubscription
criteria. Paragraph 2.41 states that schools designated
by the Secretary of State as having a religious
character (faith schools) are permitted by section 50 of
the Equality Act 2006 to use faith-based
oversubscription criteria in order to give priority in
admission to children who are members of, or who
practise, their faith or denomination. It also states that
faith-based criteria must be framed so as not to
conflict with other legislation such as equality and
race relations legislation [emphasis added].
Paragraph 2.43 of the 2007 Code states:
“It is primarily for the relevant faith provider group or
religious authority to decide how membership or
practice is to be demonstrated, and, accordingly, in
determining faith-based oversubscription criteria,
admission authorities for faith schools should only use
the methods and definitions agreed by their faith
provider group or religious authority.”
Paragraph 2.47 states:
“Religious authorities may provide guidance for the
admission authorities of schools of their faith that sets
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out what objective processes and criteria may be used
to establish whether a child is a member of, or whether
they practise, the faith. The admission authorities of
faith schools that propose to give priority on the basis
of membership or practice of their faith should have
regard to such guidance, to the extent that the
guidance is consistent with the mandatory provisions
and guidelines of this Code.”39
E.

The Legal Questions

To restate, under British Law religious schools (even those who
accept government funding) are allowed to give preference in
admissions to students who are members of the school’s religious
community.40 JFS, as a government recognized Jewish school, is
allowed to give admissions preference to Jews. What is under
question in this case is whether the method (i.e. Jewish status as
determined by the Office of the Chief Rabbi which means either
conversion recognized by Orthodox authorities, or matrilineal descent
from a woman recognized as Jewish by the Orthodox authorities)
utilized by the JFS admissions committee to determine whether or not
an applicant is Jewish is a religious test, and thus permissible, or an
ethnic test, and thus an impermissible violation of the Race Relations
Act.
There were two forms of unlawful discrimination under the Race

39. Id. at ¶¶ 176−77.
40. Current British Law is governed by the Equality Act of 2010, which states
that unless a school falls under the Special Schools Exception, it shall be held to the
discrimination standard established under the Act. See Equality Act, 2010, c. 15, §
85(7)(b) (U.K.). The Secretary of State is empowered to create a code regulating
school admission policies. See School Standards and Framework Act, 1998, c. 31, §
84(1)−(2) (U.K.). This code, known as the “School Admission Code,” outlines the
criteria for faith-based oversubscription admission policies. The 2007 code was in
place during the decision of JFS. DEP’T. EDUC., SCH. ADMISSIONS. CODE, §§
2.18−2.20 (2007). School Admissions Code 2012, in force since Feb. 1, 2012, is
the current guidance and it deals with faith-based oversubscription in schools with
a religious character. DEP’T. EDUC., SCH. ADMISSIONS CODE, §§ 1.36−1.38 (2012).
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Relations Act: direct and indirect discrimination.41 In trying to
determine whether the test of matrilineal descent was a religious or
an ethnic test, the judges utilized this distinction in an attempt to
narrowly define the legal question at hand, as direct and indirect
discrimination are understood to be “mutually exclusive” by the
judges in the majority.42 The majority of the Court found the
admissions process utilizing matrilineal descent to be in direct
violation of the Act, thus absolving the court from discussing the
issue of indirect discrimination.43
In summing up the majority’s position to limit its decision to
determining whether direct discrimination occurred, Lord Philips
wrote:
It is common ground that JFS discriminated against M
in relation to its terms of admission to the school. The
issue of whether this amounted to unlawful direct
discrimination on racial grounds depends on the
answer to two questions: (1) What are the grounds
upon which M was refused entry? (2) Are those
grounds racial?44
Lady Hale summarizes the distinction between direct and
indirect discrimination as determined by precedent.
The basic difference between direct and indirect
discrimination is plain…The rule against direct
discrimination aims to achieve formal equality of
treatment: there must be no less favourable treatment
between otherwise similarly situated people on
grounds of colour, race, nationality or ethnic or
national origins. Indirect discrimination looks beyond
formal equality towards a more substantive equality of
results: criteria which appear neutral on their face may
have a disproportionately adverse impact upon people
of a particular colour, race, nationality or ethnic or

41. Race Relations Act, 1976, c. 74, §§ 1(1)(a)−1(1)(b) (U.K.) (amended
2000); see JFS, 15 UKSC at § 78, 93 (Lord Mance) (discussing direct and indirect
discrimination).
42. JFS, 15 UKSC at ¶ 57 (Lady Hale); id. at ¶ 237 (Lord Walker, concurring).
43. Id. at ¶ 51 (Lord Phillips); id. at ¶ 71 (Lady Hale); id. at ¶ 103 (Lord
Mance); id. at ¶ 123 (Lord Kerr); id. at ¶ 154 (Lord Clarke).
44. Id. at ¶ 12 (Lord Phillips).
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national origins.
Direct and indirect discrimination are mutually
exclusive. You cannot have both at once. As
Mummery LJ explained in Elias, at para 117, “The
conditions of liability, the available defences to
liability and the available defences to remedies differ.”
The main difference between them is that direct
discrimination cannot be justified. Indirect
discrimination can be justified if it is a proportionate
means of achieving a legitimate aim.
But it is significant that section 57(3) provides that, in
respect of the earlier form of indirect discrimination
under section 1(1)(b), “no award of damages shall be
made if the respondent proves that the requirement or
condition in question was not applied with the
intention of treating the claimant unfavourably on
racial grounds.” We are concerned with the later form
of indirect discrimination, under section 1(1A), to
which section 57(3) does not apply, but the fact that
this exception to the available remedies was made
suggests that Parliament did not consider that an
intention to discriminate on racial grounds was a
necessary component of either direct or indirect
discrimination. One can act in a discriminatory
manner without meaning to do so or realising that one
is. Long-standing authority at the highest level
confirms this important principle.45
Two cases are key to the court’s understanding of direct
discrimination: R v Birmingham City Council, ex p. Equal
Opportunities Commission46 and James v Eastleigh Borough

45. Id. at ¶¶ 56−57 (Lady Hale).
46. [1989] 1 A.C. 1155 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (finding that the
Council’s merit-based admission policy for single-sex schools constituted unlawful
discrimination under the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975 because female students
had to ultimately earn higher marks in the entry exams than male students).
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Council.47 Both involve sex discrimination by local government
authorities.48 In R v Birmingham admission to a selective single-sex
grammar school was at issue:
As is well known, there were more grammar school
places for boys than for girls in Birmingham with the
result that girls had to do better than boys in the
entrance examination in order to secure a place. The
council did not mean to discriminate. It bore the girls
no ill will. It had simply failed to correct a historical
imbalance in the places available. It was nevertheless
guilty of direct discrimination on grounds of sex.49
In a quotation from the James v. Eastleigh B.C. opinion, Lord
Phillips points out the language that has come to stand in for the
judicial logic: would someone have received different treatment “but
for” his sex/race/age/religion?50 If yes, direct discrimination has
occurred:
“There is discrimination under the statute if there is
less favourable treatment on the ground of sex, in
other words if the relevant girl or girls would have
received the same treatment as the boys but for their
sex.”51
In James v. Eastleigh B.C., entrance to a public swimming
pool was free for all persons who were of pensionable age, which
was 60 for women and 65 for men.52 In utilizing pension age to
determine the cost of swimming, the court found the council engaged
in direct discrimination of men by refusing to provide swimming
facilities.53

47. [1990] 2 A.C. 751 (H.L.) (finding the Council’s policy of allowing free
entry to citizens of pensionable age as a discrimination based upon gender as
pensionable age for females is 60 years of age and the age for men is 65 years of
age).
48. Birmingham, [1989] 1 A.C. at 1155; James, [1990] 2 A.C. at 751.
49. JFS, 15 UKSC at ¶ 58 (Lady Hale).
50. Id. at ¶ 16 (Lord Phillips) (citing Lord Goff’s judgment from James, 2 A.C.
at 765, as outlining a “but for” question in identifying the factual criterion at the
basis of the discrimination).
51. Id. at ¶ 13 (emphasis added) (quoting R v. Birmingham City Council, ex p.
Equal Opportunities Commission, [1989] A.C. 1155, 1194 (U.K.)).
52. James, [1990] 2 A.C. at 751.
53. Id. at 782.
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The Council discriminated between men and women,
aged between 60 and 65, in relation to the terms on
which they were admitted to swim in a leisure centre
run by the Council. Women in this age band were
admitted free whereas men had to pay an entry charge.
The motive for this discrimination could perhaps be
inferred by the manner in which this rule was
expressed, namely that those of pensionable age were
to be admitted free of charge; women became of
pensionable age when they were 60, men when they
were 65. Counsel for the Council explained . . . that
the council’s reason for giving free access to those of
pensionable age was that their resources were likely to
have been reduced by retirement. The Court of Appeal
had treated this motive as being the relevant “ground”
for discriminating in favour of women and against men
rather than the factual criterion for discrimination,
which was plainly the sex of the person seeking
admission to the centre.54
In both of these cases, the Court ruled that the girls in R v
Birmingham City Council and the men in James v. Eastleigh B.C.
suffered direct discrimination because of their sex.55 The majority
found in both cases that the individuals were treated differently “but
for” their sex.56 These decisions, in the opinion of Lord Phillips, were
based upon an evaluation of the criteria used in making a decision
and not upon a motive for that decision:
The contrast between the reasoning of the majority
and of the minority in this case is, I believe, clear. I
find the reasoning of the majority compelling.

54. JFS, 15 UKSC at ¶ 14 (Lord Phillips) (citing James, [1990] 2 A.C. at 758)
(distinguishing the Court of Appeals’ treatment of motive for discrimination from
the factual criterion required to determine discrimination).
55. Birmingham, [1989] 1 A.C. at 1196−97 (Lord Goff); James, [1990] 2 AC.
at 782; see also JFS, 15 UKSC at ¶ 20 (Lord Phillips) (stating that discrimination
should be based on the factual criterion applied, rather than the motive for the
discrimination).
56. Birmingham, [1989] 1 A.C. at 1196−97 (Lord Goff); James, [1990] 2 A.C.
at 782; see also JFS, 15 UKSC at ¶ 20 (Lord Phillips).
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Whether there has been discrimination on the ground
of sex or race depends upon whether sex or race was
the criterion applied as the basis for discrimination.
The motive for discriminating according to that
criterion is not relevant.57
Indeed, it is this legal logic that undergirds the majority’s
decision in this case and radically differentiates the thinking of the
majority from the minority.58
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS: Does the “but for” test apply to
issues of membership when the categories are ambiguous? Or more
aptly for the JFS case, does the “but for” distinction work when the
issue at hand is that of a religious community when the dispute is
happening within that community? The examples given for this “but
for” test work around the existence of distinct/discrete groups
(men/women, boys/girls) but do not seem to apply when two groups
are claiming to have one (shared?) identity. In other words, unlike the
JFS case, determining whether an individual was a man or a woman
was not the central dispute to these precedent cases. Thus, I suggest
the precedents might be entirely unhelpful. Does the “but for” test
help, or hinder, a discussion of determining discrimination in cases
where the category of identity itself is contested?
1.

Determining “Racial Grounds”: Jewish Identity as Ethnicity

Of course a key part of determining whether or not direct
discrimination occurred in violation of the Race Relations Act rests
upon how the court understands the term “racial grounds.” And in the
specific context of the JFS case, the Court must grapple with how it
understands Jewishness in terms of the category of race. All the
judges, as well as both E & M and JFS, agree that a Jewish ethnic
group exists for the purposes of this Act.59 Yet at the same time, both
the Court and the litigants also recognize Jewishness as a religious
category as well.60 In determining who is an ethnic Jew, one also
must attend to religious definitions as well.
JFS argued to the Court that there was indeed a Jewish ethnic

57. JFS, 15 UKSC at ¶ 20 (Lord Phillips).
58. See infra Part II.C.
59. See, e.g., JFS, 15 UKSC at ¶ 38 (Lord Phillips); id. at ¶ 67 (Lady Hale); id.
at ¶ 121 (Lord Kerr); id. at ¶ 183 (Lord Hope, concurring).
60. See, e.g., id. at ¶ 2 (Lord Phillips); id. at ¶ 76 (Lord Mance).
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group according to the Act.61 However, the school argued that at the
same time there was also a Jewish religious group and that these two
groups were not coterminous.62 The school argued that this dispute
over admissions had to do with the recognition of the validity of the
mother’s conversion—that she had undergone a Masorti Jewish
conversion not recognized by the Orthodox Jewish community.63
Thus, this was a religious dispute and was a question of the Orthodox
Jewish religious community determining its own standards for
membership members through religious law.
The precedent utilized by the Court when considering how to
define ethnic groups was set in Mandla v. Dowell Lee.64 Lord Phillips
explains this case, as well as how the lawyers arguing for JFS
understand its applicability to this dispute:
I shall summarise the case advanced by Lord Pannick
QC for JFS in my own words. There exists a Jewish
ethnic group. Discrimination on the ground of
membership of this group is racial discrimination. The
criteria of membership of this group are those
identified by Lord Fraser of Tullybelton in Mandla v
Dowell Lee [1983] 2 AC 548. In that case a
declaration was sought that refusing admission to a
school of a Sikh wearing a turban was indirect racial
discrimination. The critical question was whether
Sikhs comprised a “racial group” for the purposes of
the 1976 Act. It was common ground that they were
not a group defined by reference to colour, race,
nationality or national origins.
It was contended, however, that they were a group
defined by “ethnic origins.” In considering the
meaning of this phrase, Lord Fraser at pp 561–562

61. Id. at ¶ 242 (Lord Brown, concurring).
62. Id. at ¶ 76 (Lord Mance).
63. Id. at ¶ 6 (Lord Phillips).
64. [1983] 2 A.C. 548 (H.L.) (U.K.) (finding a private school’s refusal to admit
a Sikh student who refused to cease wearing a turban and to cut his hair a case of
indirect discrimination, and developing a seven-factor test in analyzing ethnicity);
JFS, 15 UKSC at ¶ 28.
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referred to a meaning of “ethnic” given by the
Supplement to the Oxford English Dictionary (1972):
“pertaining to or having commo§n racial, cultural,
religious, or linguistic characteristics, esp. designating
a racial or other group within a larger system…” His
comments in relation to this definition have been set
out in full by Lord Mance at paragraph 83 of his
judgment and as Lord Mance remarked they merit
reading in full. It suffices, however, to cite the passage
at p. 562 where Lord Fraser set out the seven
characteristics, some of which he held would be
shared by, and would be the touchstone of, members
of an ethnic group:
“The conditions which appear to me to be essential are
these: (1) a long shared history, of which the group is
conscious as distinguishing it from other groups, and
the memory of which it keeps alive; (2) a cultural
tradition of its own, including family and social
customs and manners, often but not necessarily
associated with religious observance. In addition to
those two essential characteristics the following
characteristics are, in my opinion, relevant; (3) either a
common geographical origin, or descent from a small
number of common ancestors; (4) a common
language, not necessarily peculiar to the group; (5) a
common literature peculiar to the group; (6) a
common religion different from that of neighbouring
groups or from the general community surrounding it;
(7) being a minority or being an oppressed or a
dominant group within a larger community, for
example a conquered people (say, the inhabitants of
England shortly after the Norman conquest) and their
conquerors might both be ethnic groups.
A group defined by reference to enough of these
characteristics would be capable of including converts,
for example, persons who marry into the group, and of
excluding apostates. Provided a person who joins the
group feels himself or herself to be a member of it,
and is accepted by other members, then he is, for the
purposes of the Act, a member.”
[. . .]
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It is possible today to identify two different cohorts [of
Jews], one by the Mandla criteria and one by the
Orthodox criteria. The cohort identified by the Mandla
criteria forms the Jewish ethnic group. They no longer
have a common geographical origin or descent from a
small number of common ancestors, but they share
what Lord Fraser regarded as the essentials, a long
shared history, of which the group is conscious as
distinguishing it from other groups and the memory of
which it keeps alive and a cultural tradition of its own,
including family and social customs and manners,
often but not necessarily associated with religious
observance. The man in the street would recognise a
member of this group as a Jew, and discrimination on
the ground of membership of the group as racial
discrimination. The Mandla group will include many
who are in the cohort identified by the Orthodox
criteria, for many of them will satisfy the matrilineal
test. But there will be some who do not.
So far as the cohort identified by the Orthodox test is
concerned, many of these will also fall within the
Mandla group. But there will be some, indeed many,
who do not. Most of these will be descendants from
Jewish women who married out of and abandoned the
Jewish faith. They will not satisfy the two vital criteria
identified by Lord Fraser. Indeed, they may be
unaware of the genetic link that renders them Jewish
according to the Orthodox test.
Thus, in Lord Pannick’s submissions the Orthodox test is not one
that necessarily identifies members of the Jewish ethnic group. It is a
test founded on religious dogma and discrimination on the basis of
that test is religious discrimination, not racial discrimination.65
2.

The Role of the Chief Rabbi: Jewish Identity as Religious

As mentioned, JFS stated that the school would recognize an
applicant as Jewish if that applicant would also be recognized as

65. Id. at ¶¶ 28, 30−32 (Lord Phillips).
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Jewish by the Office of the Chief Rabbi. The Court claims that it
takes no issue with a religious school utilizing the guidance of a
religious authority in determining religious community
membership.66 Rather the majority focuses narrowly on whether the
particular standards given by the Chief Rabbi to JFS to determine
Orthodox Jewish identity were discriminatory on racial grounds.67
Implicit in this limiting move is a judicial evaluation of both the
authority of the Chief Rabbi, as well as a judicial evaluation of the
religious tenets espoused by the Chief Rabbi. While the Court wants
to get itself out of the business of evaluating the content of religion, it
seems to be doing just that.
But for the purposes of clarity, below are excerpts of how
various judges understood both the position of the Chief Rabbi and
the advice given to JFS by the Chief Rabbi. Lord Hope provides a
useful summary of the Chief Rabbi’s guidance to JFS on determining
Jewish identity:
In connection with JFS’s admissions for the year 2009 an
application form, Application for Confirmation of Jewish Status, was
issued by the OCR. Parents were required to select from the
following options:
“(a) I confirm that the child’s biological mother is
Jewish by birth.
(b) I confirm that the child’s biological mother has
converted to Judaism.
(c) I confirm that the child is adopted [in which case
the child’s Jewish status must be separately verified].”
The guidance notes to the application form state:
“Jewish status is not dependent on synagogue
affiliation per se, though Jewish status will not be
confirmed if the child, or any of his/her maternal
antecedents, converted to Judaism under non-orthodox
auspices.
66. Id. at ¶ 75 (Lord Mance) (noting that Equality Act of 2006, § 50(1)
exempts schools having a religious character under the 1998 School Standards and
Framework Act from the prohibition against discrimination on the grounds of
religious belief).
67. See, e.g., id. at ¶ 27 (Lord Phillips); id. at ¶ 65 (Lady Hale); id. at ¶ 127
(Lord Clarke).
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If the child’s parents were not married under orthodox
auspices, further investigation will be necessary before
confirmation of Jewish status is issued. This usually
entails obtaining additional documentary evidence
down the maternal line.”
If the child’s mother was not herself born to a Jewish
mother but converted to Judaism before the birth of
the child, further inquiries are undertaken by the OCR
before it is prepared to recognise the child as Jewish.
The OCR does not recognise the validity of
conversions carried out by non-Orthodox authorities,
as they do not require converts to subscribe fully to the
tenets of Orthodox Judaism.
The exacting process that is indicated by the wording
of the application form is firmly rooted in Orthodox
Jewish religious law. Religious status is not dependent
on belief, religious practice or on attendance at a
synagogue. It is entirely dependent upon descent or
conversion. It depends on establishing that the person
was born to a Jewish mother or has undergone a valid
conversion to Judaism. That is a universal rule that
applies throughout all Orthodox Judaism. M’s
ineligibility for admission to JFS was due to the fact
that different standards are applied by the Chief Rabbi
from those applied by the Masorti, Reform and
Progressive communities in the determining of a
person’s religious status. Nothing that I say in this
opinion is to be taken as calling into question the right
of the OCR to define Jewish identity in the way it
does. I agree with Lord Brown that no court would
ever dictate who, as a matter of Orthodox religious
law, is to be regarded as Jewish. Nor is it in doubt that
the OCR’s guidance as to the effect of Orthodox
Jewish religious law was given in the utmost good
faith. The question that must now be faced is a
different question. It is whether it discriminates on
racial grounds against persons who are not recognised
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by the OCR as Jewish.68
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS: The Court and all parties to the
lawsuit agree that Jewish identity is both an ethnic identity and a
religious identity. The central challenge of this case is to disentangle
the religious from the ethnic in determining making their judgments,
as religious discrimination is permissible, while racial discrimination
is not. The issue then, is this—do you think the matrilineal test is a
religious test or a racial one? Or is it both? Is the Court the best place
to adjudicate such a decision?
3. Legal Outcomes—The Court’s Ruling
The Court decided that the JFS Admissions Requirements that
determined Jewish status by matrilineal descent was in violation of
the Race Relations Act of 1976.69 Five of the judges determined that
utilizing matrilineal descent was an example of direct racial
discrimination in violation of the Race Relations Act;70 two judges
determined that utilizing matrilineal descent was an example of
indirect racial discrimination, which are not justified, in violation of
the Race Relations Act; 71 and two judges determined that utilizing
matrilineal descent was not racial discrimination but instead was
religious discrimination.72 The same two judges found that, even if
the policy was indirect racial discrimination, discrimination was for a
legitimate purpose and was proportionate to that purpose.73
The judges found this case to be legally vexing, as is
demonstrated by the fact that all nine judges wrote an opinion voicing
the distinct legal warrants for their interpretation of the facts and the
limits—or lack thereof—of judicial reach into the religious arena.
While the selected four excerpts below do not attempt to capture
the nuance of each of the nine opinions, they summarize the basic
contours of the four outcomes of this case in the judges’ own words.

68. Id. at ¶¶ 181−82 (Lord Hope, concurring).
69. Id. at ¶ 45 (Lord Phillips); id. at ¶ 71 (Lady Hale); id. at ¶ 86 (Lord
Mance); id. at ¶ 117 (Lord Kerr); id. at ¶ 136 (Lord Clarke).
70. Id.
71. Id. at ¶ 218 (Lord Hope, concurring); id. at ¶ 235 (Lord Walker,
concurring).
72. Id. at ¶ 230 (Lord Rodger, concurring); id. at ¶ 242 (Lord Brown,
dissenting).
73. Id. at ¶ 233 (Lord Rodger, concurring); id. at ¶ 256 (Lord Brown,
dissenting).
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The Majority: JFS’s Admissions Requirements are Direct
Racial Discrimination (Lord Phillips, Lady Hale, Lord Mance,
Lord Kerr, Lord Clarke)

While each judge chose to write his or her own opinion, there is
a basic shared logic to all the judges who found the admissions policy
of JFS to be an example of direct racial discrimination. Namely, all
are operating within a significantly narrow judicial scope: is the
criteria used to determine Jewish status an example of racial/ethnic
test? In this narrow realm, the context for the matrilineal descent test
is irrelevant, as is the motive for applying the matrilineal test. Rather,
the judges chose to limit their examination simply to the “factual
criteria” of the test itself.
Lady Hale summarizes this position:
This case is concerned with discrimination on account
of “ethnic origins.” And the main issue is what that
means—specifically, do the criteria used by JFS to
select pupils for the school treat people differently
because of their “ethnic origins”?
My answer to that question is the same as that given
by Lord Phillips, Lord Mance, Lord Kerr and Lord
Clarke and for the same reasons. That we have each
written separate opinions underlines the fact that we
have each reached the same conclusion through a
process of independent research and reasoning. It is
only because the debate before us and between us has
called in question some fundamental principles of
discrimination law that I feel it necessary to underline
them yet again.
...
There is absolutely no doubt about why the school
acted as it did. We do not have to ask whether they
were consciously or unconsciously treating some
people who saw themselves as Jewish less favourably
than others. Everything was totally conscious and
totally transparent. M was rejected because he was not
considered to be Jewish according to the criteria
adopted by the Office of the Chief Rabbi. We do not
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need to look into the mind of the Chief Rabbi to know
why he acted as he did. If the criterion he adopted
was, as in Birmingham or James, in reality ethnicitybased, it matters not whether he was adopting it
because of a sincerely held religious belief. No-one
doubts that he is honestly and sincerely trying to do
what he believes that his religion demands of him. But
that is his motive for applying the criterion which he
applies and that is irrelevant. The question is whether
his criterion is ethnically based.
So at long last I arrive at what, in my view, is the only
question in this case. Is the criterion adopted by the
Chief Rabbi, and thus without question by the school,
based upon the child’s ethnic origins? In my view, it
clearly is. M was rejected because of his mother’s
ethnic origins, which were Italian and Roman
Catholic. The fact that the Office of the Chief Rabbi
would have over-looked his mother’s Italian origins,
had she converted to Judaism in a procedure which
they would recognise, makes no difference to this
fundamental fact. M was rejected, not because of who
he is, but because of who his mother is. That in itself
is not enough. If M had been rejected because his
mother shopped in Waitrose rather than Marks and
Spencer, that would not have been because of her or
his ethnicity. But it was because his mother was not
descended in the matrilineal line from the original
Jewish people that he was rejected. This was because
of his lack of descent from a particular ethnic group.
In this respect, there can be no doubt that his ethnic
origins were different from those of the pupils who
were admitted. It was not because of his religious
beliefs. The school was completely indifferent to
these. They admit pupils who practise all
denominations of Judaism, or none at all, or even
other religions entirely, as long as they are
halachically Jewish, descended from the original
Jewish people in the matrilineal line.
There is no doubt that the Jewish people are an ethnic
group within the meaning of the Race Relations Act
1976. No Parliament, passing legislation to protect

399

400

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 29:366

against racial discrimination in the second half of the
twentieth century, could possibly have failed to protect
the Jewish people, who had suffered so unspeakably
before, during and after the Holocaust. If Parliament
had adopted a different model of protection, we would
not be here today. Parliament might have adopted a
model of substantive equality, allowing distinctions
which brought historically disadvantaged groups up to
the level of historically advantaged groups. But it did
not do so. It adopted a model of formal equality,
which allows only carefully defined distinctions and
otherwise expects symmetry. A man must be treated
as favourably as a woman, an Anglo-Saxon as
favourably as an African Caribbean, a non-Jew as
favourably as a Jew. Any differentiation between
them, even if it is to redress historic disadvantage,
must be authorised by legislation.
This means that it is just as unlawful to treat one
person more favourably on the ground of his ethnic
origin as it is to treat another person less favourably.
There can be no doubt that, if an employer were to
take exactly the same criterion as that used by the
Office of the Chief Rabbi and refuse to employ a
person because the Chief Rabbi would regard him as
halachically Jewish, the employer would be treating
that person less favourably on grounds of his ethnic
origin. As Lord Kerr explains, there can be no logical
distinction between treating a person less favourably
because he does have a particular ethnic origin and
treating him less favourably because he does not.
Some may feel that discrimination law should modify
its rigid adherence to formal symmetry and recognise
a greater range of justified departures than it does at
present. There may or may not be a good case for
allowing Jewish schools to adopt criteria which they
believe to be required by religious law even if these
are ethnically based. As far as we know, no other faith
schools in this country adopt descent-based criteria for
admission. Other religions allow infants to be admitted
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as a result of their parents’ decision. But they do not
apply an ethnic criterion to those parents. The
Christian Church will admit children regardless of
who their parents are. Yet the Jewish law has enabled
the Jewish people and the Jewish religion to survive
throughout centuries of discrimination and
persecution. The world would undoubtedly be a poorer
place if they had not. Perhaps they should be allowed
to continue to follow that law.
But if such allowance is to be made, it should be made
by Parliament and not by the courts’ departing from
the long-established principles of the antidiscrimination legislation. The vehicle exists in the
Equality Bill, which completed its committee stage in
the House of Commons in the 2008-09 session and
will be carried over into the 2009-10 session. The
arguments for and against such a departure from the
general principles of the legislation could then be
thoroughly debated. The precise scope of any
exception could also be explored. We know from the
helpful intervention of the Board of Deputies of
British Jews that the Masorti, Reform and Liberal
denominations of Judaism have welcomed the result,
if not the reasoning, of the decision of the Court of
Appeal and would not wish for the restoration of the
previous admission criteria. That is a debate which
should not be resolved in court but by Parliament. We
must not allow our reluctance to enter into that debate,
or to be seen to be imposing our will upon a
wellmeaning religious body, to distort the well settled
principles of our discrimination law. That is to allow
the result to dictate the reasoning.
This was, in my view, a clear case of direct
discrimination on grounds of ethnic origin. It follows
that, however justifiable it might have been, however
benign the motives of the people involved, the law
admits of no defence.74

74. Id. at ¶¶ 54−55, 65−71 (Lady Hale).
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Concurring in the Result: JFS’s Admissions Requirements are
Indirect Racial Discrimination (Lord Hope, Lord Walker)

Lord Hope and Lord Walker both found the admissions policy of
JFS to be in violation of the Race Relations Act, but unlike the
majority, they refused to examine the test of Jewish status by
matrilineal descent apart from its religious context.75 In bringing the
religious factor back into the legal discussion, and expanding the
scope of judicial view slightly, Judges Hope and Walker still found
that the admissions policy was discriminatory, but indirectly so.76
Lord Hope wrote:
At one level there is no dispute about the reason why
M was denied admission to JFS. The school’s
admissions policy was based on the guidance which it
received from the OCR. Thus far the mental processes
of the alleged discriminator do not need to be
examined to discover why he acted as he did. The
dispute between the parties is essentially one of
categorisation: was the OCR’s guidance given on
grounds of race, albeit for a religious reason, or was it
solely on religious grounds? For JFS, Lord Pannick
QC submits that M failed only because JFS was giving
priority to members of the Jewish faith as defined by
the religious authority of that faith, which was a
religious criterion. That was the ground of the
decision. The Court of Appeal was wrong to hold that
the ground was that M was not regarded as of Jewish
ethnic origin, and that the theological reasons for
taking this view was the motive for adopting the
criterion: para 29. For E, Ms Rose submits that Lord
Pannick’s submissions confused the ground for the
decision with its motive. The ground spoke for itself.
It was that M was not regarded according to Orthodox

75. See id. at ¶ 204 (Lord Hope, concurring); id. at ¶ 235 (Lord Walker,
concurring).
76. Id. at ¶ 218 (Lord Hope, concurring); id. at ¶ 235 (Lord Walker,
concurring).
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Jewish principles as Jewish. This meant that he was
being discriminated against on grounds relating to his
ethnicity. This was racial discrimination within the
meaning of the statute.
These contradictory assertions must now be resolved. I
wish to stress again that the issue is not simply
whether M is a member of a separate ethnic group
from those who are advantaged by JFS’s admissions
policy. That is not where the argument in this case
stops. I agree with Lord Rodger that the decision of
the majority which, as it respectfully seems to me,
does indeed stop there leads to extraordinary results.
As he puts it in para 226, one cannot help feeling that
something has gone wrong. Lord Brown makes the
same point when, in para 247 he stresses the
importance of not expanding the scope of direct
discrimination and thereby placing preferential
treatment which could be regarded as no more than
indirectly discriminatory beyond the reach of possible
justification. The crucial question is whether M was
being treated differently on grounds of that ethnicity.
The phrase “racial grounds” in section 1(1)(a) of the
1976 Act requires us to consider what those words
really mean—whether the grounds that are revealed by
the facts of this case can properly be described as
“racial”. Only if we are satisfied that this is so would it
be right for this Court to hold that this was
discrimination on racial grounds.
…
Here the discrimination between those who are, and
those who are not, recognized as Jewish was firmly
and inextricably rooted in Orthodox Jewish religious
law which it is the duty of the Chief Rabbi to interpret
and apply. The Chief Rabbi’s total concentration on
the religious issue, to the exclusion of any
consideration of ethnicity, can be illustrated by two
contrasting examples. Several similar examples were
referred to in the course of argument. A is the child of
parents, and the grandchild of grandparents, all of
whom led wholly secular lives similar to those of their
largely secular neighbours. They never observed
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Jewish religious law or joined in the social or cultural
life of the Jewish communities where they lived, but
there is unimpeachable documentary evidence that
more than a century ago the mother of A’s maternal
grandmother was converted in an Orthodox
synagogue. To the OCR A is Jewish, despite his
complete lack of Jewish ethnicity. By contrast B is the
child of parents, and the grandchild of grandparents,
all of whom have faithfully observed Jewish religious
practices and joined actively in the social and cultural
life of the Jewish community, but there is
unimpeachable documentary evidence that more than
a century ago the mother of B’s maternal grandmother
was converted in a non-Orthodox synagogue. To the
OCR B is not Jewish, despite his obvious Jewish
ethnicity. Descent is only necessary because of the
need, in these examples, to go back three generations.
But having gone back three generations, the OCR
applies a wholly religious test to what has been
identified as the critical event. For the reasons given
by Lord Rodger, the part that conversion plays in this
process is crucial to a proper understanding of its true
nature. It cannot be disregarded, as Lady Hale
suggests in para 66, as making no difference. It shows
that the inquiry is about a religious event to be decided
according to religious law.
For these reasons I would hold that the decision that
was taken in M’s case was on religious grounds only.
This was not a case of direct discrimination on racial
grounds. On this issue, in respectful agreement with
Lord Rodger, Lord Walker and Lord Brown, I would
set aside the decision reached by the Court of Appeal.
…
In my opinion, for the reasons that Lord Brown gives
in paras 252-253, JFS has shown that its aim is a
legitimate one. The essential point is that a faith
school is entitled to pursue a policy which promotes
the religious principles that underpin its faith. It is
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entitled to formulate its oversubscriptions criteria to
give preference to those children whose presence in
the school will make it possible for it to pursue that
policy. The legitimacy of the policy is reinforced by
the statutory background. It has not emerged out of
nowhere. It has been developed in accordance with the
Code which permits faith schools to define their
conditions for admission by reference either to
membership of the faith or to practice. The
justification for the Code lies exclusively in a belief
that those who practise the faith or are members of it
will best promote the religious ethos of the school. In
Orphanos v Queen Mary College [1985] AC 761,
772–773 Lord Fraser said that a typical example of a
requirement which could be justified without regard to
the nationality or race of the person to whom it was
applied was Panesar v Nestlé Co Ltd (Note) [1980]
ICR 144, where it was held that a rule forbidding the
wearing of beards in the respondent’s chocolate
factory was justifiable on hygienic grounds
notwithstanding that the proportion of Sikhs who
could conscientiously comply with it was considerably
smaller than the proportion of non-Sikhs who could
comply with it. It was, he said, purely a matter of
public health and nothing whatever to do with racial
grounds. I would apply the same reasoning to this
case.
This leaves, however, the question of proportionality.
The Court of Appeal, having concluded that the
criterion did not have an aim that was legitimate, did
not attempt to examine this issue: para 47. Before
Munby J it was submitted by Ms Rose that JFS’s
admissions policy did not properly balance the impact
of the policy on those like M adversely affected by it
and the needs of the school: para 199. He rejected this
argument for two reasons. One was that the kind of
policy that is in question in this case is not materially
different from that which gives preference in
admission to a Muslim school to those who were born
Muslim or preference in admission to a Catholic
school to those who have been baptised. The other was
that an alternative admissions policy based on such
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factors as adherence or commitment to Judaism would
not be a means of achieving JFS’s aims and
objectives: paras 200-201. In my opinion these reasons
miss the point to which Ms Rose’s submission was
directed. The question is whether putting M at a
disadvantage was a proportionate means of achieving
the aim of the policy. It was for JFS to show that they
had taken account of the effect of the policy on him
and balanced its effects against what was needed to
achieve the aim of the policy. As Peter Gibson LJ
noted in Barry v Midland Bank plc [1999] ICR 319,
335–336 the means adopted must be appropriate and
necessary to achieving the objective.
I do not think that JFS have shown that this was so.
Lord Pannick submitted that there was no other way of
giving effect to the policy. If the school were to admit
M, this would be to deny a place to a child who was
regarded as Jewish by the OCR. This was inevitable as
the school was oversubscribed. But what is missing is
any sign that the school’s governing body addressed
their minds to the impact that applying the policy
would have on M and comparing it with the impact on
the school. As Ms Rose pointed out, the disparate
impact of the policy on children in M’s position was
very severe. They are wholly excluded from the very
significant benefit of state-funded education in
accordance with their parents’ religious convictions,
whereas there are alternatives for children recognised
by the OCR although many in the advantaged group
do not share the school’s faith-based reason for giving
them priority. The school claimed to serve the whole
community. But the way the policy was applied
deprived members of the community such as M, who
wished to develop his Jewish identity, of secondary
Jewish education in the only school that is available.
There is no evidence that the governing body gave
thought to the question whether less discriminatory
means could be adopted which would not undermine
the religious ethos of the school. Consideration might
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have been given, for example, to the possibility of
admitting children recognised as Jewish by any of the
branches of Judaism, including those who were
Masorti, Reform or Liberal. Consideration might have
been given to the relative balance in composition of
the school’s intake from time to time between those
recognised as Jewish by the OCR who were
committed to the Jewish religion and those who were
not, and as to whether in the light of it there was room
for the admission of a limited number of those
committed to the Jewish religion who were recognised
as Jewish by one of the other branches. Ms Rose said
that the adverse impact would be much less if a
different criterion were to be adopted. But the same
might be true if the criterion were to be applied less
rigidly. There may perhaps be reasons, as Lord Brown
indicates (see para 258), why solutions of that kind
might give rise to difficulty. But, as JFS have not
addressed them, it is not entitled to a finding that the
means that it adopted were proportionate.
…
The problem that JFS faces in this case is a different
one, as the context is different. Under section 1(1A)(c)
of the Race Relations Act 1976 the onus is on it to
show that the way the admissions policy was applied
in M’s case was proportionate. It is not for the court to
search for a justification for it: see Mummery LJ’s
valuable and instructive judgment in R (Elias) v
Secretary of State for Defence [2006] 1 WLR 3213,
paras 131–133. JFS failed to discharge its duty under
section 71 of the Act to have regard to the need to
eliminate discrimination. It is having to justify
something that it did not even consider required
justification. The question, as to which there is no
obvious answer either way, was simply not addressed.
As a result the court does not have the statistical or
other evidence that it would need to decide whether or
not the application of the policy in M’s case was
proportionate. It may well be, as Lord Brown
indicates, that devising a new oversubscriptions policy
that is consistent with the school’s legitimate aim
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would be fraught with difficulty. But it was for JFS to
explore this problem and, having done so, to
demonstrate that whatever policy it came up with was
proportionate. So, although I do not arrive at this
conclusion by the same route as Lord Mance, I agree
with him that on the material before the Court the
admissions policy cannot be held to have been
justified.
I would hold that, by applying the oversubscription
criteria to M in a way that put him at a particular
disadvantage when compared with others not of the
same ethnicity by reason of matrilineal descent, JFS
discriminated against him in breach of section 1(1A)
of the Race Relations Act 1976, and that E is entitled
to a declaration to that effect.77
iii.

The Dissent: JFS’s Admissions Requirements are not Direct
Discrimination, but Permitted Religious Discrimination (Lord
Rodger, Lord Brown)

Lord Rodger and Lord Brown found that this case principally
involves a religious dispute between two Jewish communities and
thus this is not a dispute that a secular court should resolve.78 Their
determination that this dispute is religious, and not racial, depends
heavily upon a different understanding of the facts of the case, and
the grounds for the admissions decision. Lord Rodger wrote:
The purpose of designating schools as having a
religious character is not, of course, to ensure that
there will be a school where Jewish or Roman
Catholic children, for example, can be segregated off
to receive good teaching in French or physics. That
would be religious discrimination of the worst kind
which Parliament would not have authorised. Rather,
the whole point of such schools is their religious
character. So the whole point of designating the

77. Id. at ¶¶ 187−88, 203−04, 209−12, 214−15 (Lord Hope, concurring).
78. Id. at ¶¶ 224−25 (Lord Rodger, dissenting); id. at ¶¶ 239, 248–249 (Lord
Brown, dissenting).
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Jewish Free School as having a Jewish character is
that it should provide general education within a
Jewish religious framework. More particularly, the
education is to be provided within an Orthodox
religious framework. Hence the oversubscription
admission criteria adopted after consulting the Chief
Rabbi. The School’s policy is to give priority to
children whom the Orthodox Chief Rabbi recognises
as Jewish. From the standpoint of Orthodoxy, no other
policy would make sense. This is because, in its eyes,
irrespective of whether they adhere to Orthodox,
Masorti, Progressive or Liberal Judaism, or are not in
any way believing or observant, these are the
children—and the only children—who are bound by
the Jewish law and practices which, it is hoped, they
will absorb at the School and then observe throughout
their lives. Whether they will actually do so is, of
course, a different matter.
The dispute can be summarised in this way. E, who is
himself a Masorti Jew, wants his son, whom he
regards as Jewish, to be admitted to the School as a
Jewish child. He complains because the School, whose
admission criteria provide that only children
recognised as Jewish by the Office of the (Orthodox)
Chief Rabbi are to be considered for admission, will
not consider admitting his son, who is recognised as
Jewish by the Masorti authorities but not by the Chief
Rabbi. If anything, this looks like a dispute between
two rival religious authorities, the Office of the Chief
Rabbi and the Masorti authorities, as to who is Jewish.
But E claims—and this Court will now declare—that,
when the governors refused to consider M for
admission, they were actually treating him less
favourably than they would have treated a child
recognised as Jewish by the Office of the Chief Rabbi
“on racial grounds”: Race Relations Act 1976, section
1(1)(a).
The decision of the majority means that there can in
future be no Jewish faith schools which give
preference to children because they are Jewish
according to Jewish religious law and belief. If the
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majority are right, expressions of sympathy for the
governors of the School seem rather out of place since
they are doing exactly what the Race Relations Act
exists to forbid: they are refusing to admit children to
their school on racial grounds. That is what the
Court’s decision means. And, if that decision is
correct, why should Parliament amend the Race
Relations Act to allow them to do so? Instead, Jewish
schools will be forced to apply a concocted test for
deciding who is to be admitted. That test might appeal
to this secular court but it has no basis whatsoever in
3,500 years of Jewish law and teaching.
The majority’s decision leads to such extraordinary
results, and produces such manifest discrimination
against Jewish schools in comparison with other faith
schools, that one can’t help feeling that something has
gone wrong.
The crux of the matter is whether, as the majority
hold, the governors actually treated M less favourably
on grounds of his ethnic origins. They say the
governors did so, but for a bona fide religious motive.
If that is really the position, then, as Lord Pannick QC
was the first to accept on their behalf, what the
governors did was unlawful and their bona fide
religious motive could not make the slightest
difference. But to reduce the religious element in the
actions of those concerned to the status of a mere
motive is to misrepresent what they were doing. The
reality is that the Office of the Chief Rabbi, when
deciding whether or not to confirm that someone is of
Jewish status, gives its ruling on religious grounds.
Similarly, so far as the oversubscription criteria are
concerned, the governors consider or refuse to
consider children for admission on the same religious
grounds. The only question is whether, when they do
so, they are ipso facto considering or refusing to
consider children for admission on racial grounds.
Lady Hale says that M was rejected because of his
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mother’s ethnic origins which were Italian and Roman
Catholic. I respectfully disagree. His mother could
have been as Italian in origin as Sophia Loren and as
Roman Catholic as the Pope for all that the governors
cared: the only thing that mattered was that she had
not converted to Judaism under Orthodox auspices. It
was her resulting non-Jewish religious status in the
Chief Rabbi’s eyes, not the fact that her ethnic origins
were Italian and Roman Catholic, which meant that M
was not considered for admission. The governors
automatically rejected M because he was descended
from a woman whose religious status as a Jew was not
recognised by the Orthodox Chief Rabbi; they did not
reject him because he was descended from a woman
whose ethnic origins were Italian and Roman Catholic.
As in any complaint of racial discrimination, the point
can be tested by reference to the appropriate
comparator. The starting point is that both E and M
believe M to be Jewish by descent. So E applied to the
School to admit M on the basis that he was Jewish
because his Italian Catholic mother had converted to
Judaism before he was born. The mother’s Jewish
status as a result of her conversion was accordingly
the only issue which the governors were asked to
consider or did consider. They refused E’s application
because her conversion had been under non-Orthodox
auspices. Therefore the appropriate comparator is a
boy with an Italian Catholic mother whom the
governors would have considered for admission. He
could only be a boy whose mother had converted
under Orthodox auspices. The question then is: did the
governors treat M, whose mother was an Italian
Catholic who had converted under non-Orthodox
auspices, less favourably than they would have treated
a boy, whose mother was an Italian Catholic who had
converted under Orthodox auspices, on grounds of his
ethnic origins? Plainly, the answer is: No. The ethnic
origins of the two boys are exactly the same, but the
stance of the governors varies, depending on the
auspices under which the mother’s conversion took
place.
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Faced with a boy whose mother had converted under
Orthodox auspices, the governors would have
considered him for admission without pausing for a
single second to enquire whether he or his mother
came from Rome, Brooklyn, Siberia or Buenos Aires,
whether she had once been a Roman Catholic or a
Muslim, or whether he or she came from a close-knit
Jewish community or had chosen to assimilate and
disappear into secular society. In other words, the
“ethnic origins” of the child or his mother in the
Mandla v Dowell Lee [1983] 2 AC 548 sense would
not have played any part in the governors’ decision to
admit him. All that would have mattered was that his
mother had converted under Orthodox auspices.
Equally, in M’s case, the governors did not refuse to
consider admitting him on grounds of his Mandla
ethnic origins. Even supposing that the governors
knew about his origins, they were quite irrelevant and
played no part in their decision. The governors were
simply asked to consider admitting him as the son of a
Jewish mother. They declined to do so because his
mother had not converted under Orthodox auspices. It
was her non-Orthodox conversion that was crucial. In
other words, the only ground for treating M less
favourably than the comparator is the difference in
their respective mothers’ conversion—a religious, not
a racial, ground.79
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS: In allowing religious schools to
practice religious discrimination in their admissions process, while
prohibiting other forms of discrimination, the government is pressed
to make a working definition of religion for these schools. In each of
the above opinions what is the operating definition of religion,
generally? Of Judaism in particular? Who determines those terms?

79. Id. at ¶¶ 223–30 (Lord Rodger, dissenting).
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The Dissent: JFS’s Policy was Legally Permissible Indirect
Discrimination for a Legitimate Reason, Through
Proportionate Means (Lord Rodger, Lord Brown)

The two dissenting judges, Lord Brown and Lord Rodger,
having found no direct discrimination, went on to consider indirect
discrimination. Lord Brown doubted whether even indirect
discrimination had occurred,80 but found that, if it had, discrimination
was for a legitimate reason and was proportionate.81 Lord Rodger,
concurring with Brown succinctly stated the reasoning:
The aim of the School, to instill Jewish values into
children who are Jewish in the eyes of Orthodoxy, is
legitimate. And, from the standpoint of an Orthodox
school, instilling Jewish values into children whom
Orthodoxy does not regard as Jewish, at the expense
of children whom Orthodoxy does regard as Jewish,
would make no sense. That is plainly why the
School’s oversubscription policy allows only for the
admission of children recognised as Jewish by the
Office of the Chief Rabbi. I cannot see how a court
could hold that this policy is a disproportionate means
of achieving the School’s legitimate aim.82
Lord Brown expanded on the question of legitimacy,
highlighting the religious nature of JFS’s objective in admitting no
practicing, but halachically Jewish students:
The legitimacy of JFS’s aim is surely clear. Here is a
designated faith school, understandably concerned to
give preference to those children it recognises to be
members of its religion, but so oversubscribed as to be
unable to admit even all of these. The School
Admissions Code expressly allows admission criteria
based either on membership of a religion or on
practice. JFS have chosen the former. Orthodox Jews
regard education about the Jewish faith as a
fundamental religious obligation. Unlike proselytising
faiths, however, they believe that the duty to teach and

80. See id. at ¶ 250 (Lord Brown, dissenting).
81. Id. at ¶ 256.
82. Id. at ¶ 233 (Lord Rodger, dissenting).
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learn applies only to members of the religion, because
the obligations in question bind only them.83
Lord Brown found JFS’s policy proportionate for two reasons,
which he quoted from the judgment of the High Court:
Given JFS’s legitimate aim of educating children
recognised to be Jewish, is their policy of invariably
giving preference to these children over those not so
recognised a proportionate means of achieving that
aim? Answering that question in the affirmative,
Munby J, in the course of a lengthy, impressive and to
my mind convincing judgment, said this:
“[. . .] Two quite separate considerations drive me to
this conclusion. In the first place, the kind of
admissions policy in question here is not, properly
analysed, materially different from that which gives
preference in admission to a Moslem school to those
who were born Moslem or preference in admission to
a Catholic school to those who have been baptised.
But no-one suggests that such policies, whatever their
differential impact on different applicants, are other
than a proportionate and lawful means of achieving a
legitimate end. Why, [counsel] asks rhetorically,
should it be any different in the case of Orthodox
Jews? . . . I agree. Indeed, the point goes even wider
than the two examples I have given for, as [counsel]
submits, if E’s case on this point is successful then it
will probably render unlawful the admission
arrangements in a very large number of faith schools
of many different faiths and denominations.
[. . .] The other point is that made both by the Schools
Adjudicator and by [counsel for JFS]. Adopting some
alternative admissions policy based on such factors as
adherence or commitment to Judaism (even assuming
that such a concept has any meaning for this purpose
in Jewish religious law) would not be a means of

83. Id. at ¶ 252 (Lord Brown, dissenting).
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achieving JFS’s aims and objectives; on the contrary it
would produce a different school ethos. If JFS’s
existing aims and objectives are legitimate, as they
are, then a policy of giving preference to children who
are Jewish applying Orthodox Jewish principles is,
they say, necessary and proportionate—indeed, as it
seems to me, essential—to achieve those aims. . . JFS
exists as a school for Orthodox Jews. If it is to remain
a school for Orthodox Jews it must retain its existing
admissions policy; if it does not, it will cease to be a
school for Orthodox Jews. Precisely. To this argument
there is, and can be, no satisfactory answer.”
I find myself in full agreement with all of that.84
III. RESPONSES TO RULING/CURRENT STATUS
In the aftermath of the JFS decision, Jewish schools across the
United Kingdom had to develop new means of determining Jewish
status for the admissions process that did not make determinations of
Jewish identity based on ethnicity. As a result, Orthodox Jewish
schools have created “Jewish Religious Practice Tests.”85 A little
more than six months after the JFS decision, London’s Jewish
Chronicle reported that as a result of this admissions test innovation,
a Jewish applicant was denied admission at a different Jewish school
because she failed the school’s newly crafted Jewish religious
practice test.86 Kayleigh Chapple had applied for admission to King
David High School in Liverpool, England. Like JFS, King David
grants admissions preference for Jewish students. There were ninety
spots available, and ten Jewish applicants who potentially qualified
for the admissions preference. Kayleigh was the only Jewish
applicant denied admission to the Orthodox Jewish school because
her family could not satisfy the “Jewish Religious Practice
Test.”87 Kayleigh was born of a Jewish mother, making Kayleigh

84. Id. at ¶¶ 255−56 (Lord Brown, dissenting) (quoting R(E) v. Governing
Body of JFS, [2008] EWHC 1535 (Admin), [2008] ACD 87, ¶¶ 200−01 (Munby,
J.)).
85. Riazat Butt, Jewish Faith Schools Introduce Religious Observance Tests,
GUARDIAN, Sept. 28, 2009, at Educ. 1.
86. Jonathan Kalmus, Jewish Girl’s King David Places Goes to Non-Jew,
JEWISH CHRONICLE (June
11, 2010), http://www.thejc.com/news/uknews/32947/jewish-girls-king-david-place-goes-non-jew.
87. Id.

416

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 29:366

Jewish according to Orthodox law and the Chief Rabbi. Indeed,
Kayleigh’s mother is even an alumna of King David. However, the
Chappelle family is not religiously observant.88 The family initially
threatened to sue because Kayleigh has been denied the preferential
admission to King David that the Chief Rabbi has instructed she
deserves. Kayleigh was eventually accepted at a different Jewish
school in Manchester, and the Chapple family decided to not pursue
legal action.89
For the 2013 admissions process, applicants to JFS must
complete a “Certificate of Religious Practice” form in order to be
eligible for preferred admissions status.90 According to the form,
applicants may accumulate “points” by attending synagogue services,
engaging in formal Jewish education, or engaging in a Jewish
communal or welfare organization.91 Synagogue attendance must be
verified by a rabbi or another synagogue official for the form.92
CONCLUSION: “SOMETHING HAS GONE WRONG”: JEWISH
IDENTITY IN PROTESTANT CHRISTIAN TERMS
Lord Rodger, writing a strong dissenting opinion in JFS states:
The decision of the majority means that there can in
future be no Jewish faith schools which give
preference to children because they are Jewish
according to Jewish religious law and belief. . . .
Instead, Jewish schools will be forced to apply a
concocted test for deciding who is to be
admitted. That test might appeal to this secular court
but it has no basis whatsoever in 3,500 years of Jewish

88. Id.
89. Jonathan Kalmus, Girl Denied Faith School Place Treks 60 Miles, JEWISH
CHRONICLE (Sept. 7, 2010), http://www.thejc.com/news/uk-news/37973/girldenied-faith-school-place-treks-60-miles.
90. JEWISH FREE SCH., ADMISSION POLICY 2014/15 (2013), available at
http://www.jfs.brent.sch.uk/sites/default/files/attachments/JFS%20Admissions%20
Policy%202014-15.pdf.
91. JEWISH FREE SCH., CERTIFICATE OF RELIGIOUS PRACTICE (2013), available
at http://www.jfs.brent.sch.uk/sites/default/files/attachments/11%2B%20CRP%202
014.pdf.
92. Id.
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law and teaching. The majority’s decision leads to
such extraordinary results, and produces such manifest
discrimination against Jewish schools in comparison
with other faith schools, that one can’t help feeling
that something has gone wrong.93
I agree with Lord Rodger that something went wrong with the
Majority ruling in the JFS decision – but what exactly? I think that
both Lord Rodger and the Majority believe the Court is operating in a
secular space, and that the term “religion” used in a legal context is
not defined by a particular religious idiom. However, I hold that the
results of the JFS case point to a more complicated reality for legally
defined religion, and demonstrates the limits of religious freedom for
religious minorities.
The main task before the Court was to evaluate whether the
Orthodox Jewish practice of determining Jewish status through
matrilineal descent was a test of racial or religious discrimination. If
it is a racial test, then it is illegal, but if it is a religious test, then it is
legally protected. But what if it is both? What if an ethnic test is
religion? Indeed, as the JFS case shows this is not a what-if scenario,
but points to a specifically Jewish definition of religion that lacks a
Christian analog.
The Majority in the JFS case is working with a very specific
definition of religion that has been shaped by Protestant Christianity.
As I stated above, religion for the Majority is seen as the (1)
voluntary (2) faith and/or belief of (3) an autonomous
individual. Religion is a matter of personal choice and requires
affirmative assent in the form of belief. It is my contention that this
Protestant Christian definition of “religion” is what animates the
decision of the Majority in the JFS case, and why the Majority do not
understand how the little boy “M,” who self-identifies as Jewish,
speaks Hebrew, and regularly attends synagogue, could not be Jewish
according to Orthodox Jewish standards. Indeed, when the same
school regularly admits children as Jewish, with little to no Jewish
education or regular religious practice, the judges were somewhat
confounded. In a Protestant Christian frame, M’s belief, practice, and
self-identification would indicate him as religiously Jewish; the

93. R(E) v. Governing Board of JFS, [2009] UKSC 15, [2010] 2 A.C. 728
(S.C.), ¶¶ 225–26 (appeal taken from Eng.) (Lord Hope, concurring) (emphasis
added).
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religious status of M’s mother would not matter. The Majority could
not accommodate the Orthodox Jewish practice of identifying Jewish
children through their mother as religion. This was not religion in
their view, but an ethnic test, and thus was not legally permissible.
The result of the JFS case draws our attention to a challenging
question: are the definitions of religion operating in the courtrooms of
America and Europe de facto Christian definitions? If yes, as this
case suggests, what are the legal remedies for non-Christian religious
minorities who have beliefs, practices, and religious realities that go
beyond the Christian definitions? Is it possible to articulate a legal
definition of religion that is not grounded in a particular religious
framework, and thus exclusionary to those religious individuals who
do not share in that framework? The JFS case highlights a
fundamental challenge to lawmakers who enshrine religious liberty
into their legal codes and to judges who must interpret those laws.
Namely, lawmakers and judges have to define and delimit what
religion is, and as this case demonstrates, that is no simple task.

